Three weeks after Captain John Hanson McNeill was wounded October 3, 1864 leading his company of Virginia Partisan Rangers in a successful action at Meems Bottom Bridge on the Valley Pike above Mt. Jackson he seemed to be mending.  In his absence command of McNeill’s Partisan Rangers was on the shoulders of his son, 23 year-old Lt. Jesse McNeill.  With his father taking the first steps to on an apparent road to recovery at Hill’s Hotel in Harrisonburg the young Lieutenant set out to prove to the Yankees that McNeill’s Rangers were still an effective force.  On the 24^th he led them in a raid on the B & O railroad at Green Springs.  Surprising the Union detachment guarding the station he took them prisoner, tore up the railroad installations and looted the Federal supplies stored there.  What the Rangers could not carry off they destroyed.  With the raid accomplished they withdrew as quickly as they had appeared.  Picking up their rear guard at Romney they joined Captain Woodson’s Company of Missouri Partisans in camp on the South Fork above Moorefield.  Jesse had little time to consider his first successful action as commander of the Rangers.  Word soon reached him that his father had contracted pneumonia and taken a turn for the worse.  Leaving Lt. Isaac S. Welton, a distant cousin, in charge of the Rangers he joined his mother and sister at the Captain’s bedside.

General Benjamin F. Kelley, in command of the troops protecting the B & O west of Hancock, Maryland had gotten word of the Captain’s incapacity.  He had expected that the two-year long harassing raids that McNeill had lead against the railroad would slacken.  Six months before he had written that he wanted McNeill killed, captured or run out of the country.  Until the Green Springs raid he thought that his fondest wish had been granted.  Stung, he ordered Col. George R. Latham, the commander of the strong Union garrison at New Creek to take a cavalry force to Moorefield and clean out the Partisans.  Union men in the neighborhood had reported that McNeill’s company was now joined with Woodson’s command.  According to the information he had there were about 100 rebel partisans in camp at the Hardy County seat.

Jesse was watching his father fade when Latham rode out of New Creek for Moorefield on November 6^th. The column of 225 troopers of the 5^th and 6^th West Virginia Cavalry and one gun from the 1^st Illinois Artillery halted at 5 in the evening at Greenland Gap to rest 4 hours before pressing on in night march to Moorefield.  Arriving before dawn the Colonel deployed his men to surround the town and move in on the rebel command.  The troopers moved into town quickly satisfied the surprise was complete.  It was.  The town was asleep and there was not a partisan to be found. 

Shortly after dawn one of Latham’s patrols ran headlong into a partisan picket posted on the South Fork Road.  After a short and sharp skirmish the 8 pickets, one of them wounded, were captured with their horses.  Latham did not follow up the discovery of the Partisans south of the town.  He spent his time in Moorefield confiscating livestock he claimed were either stolen by the Rangers on previous raids or taken from rebel sympathizers in the neighborhood.    His troopers had become drovers herding 49 beef cattle and 460 sheep back to New Creek.  They marched in at dusk on the 8^th with mighty little to show for their raid.  The Rangers and Woodson’s Partisans were still intact.

In his report to General Kelley written on the 9^th Latham said, “There is yet a considerable amount of stock suitable for army use, and a very large amount of forage in the vicinity of Moorefield, which is being collected and sent off to the rebel army.  The rebel force at Moorefield was preparing for a raid upon our lines when we reached the place.” [1]

Jesse was still at Harrisonburg attending his father’s last hours.  The Captain gave up his hold on life on November 10^th.  He had been shot in the back while leading his last charge.  A stray shot from one McNeill’s own men had given General Kelley his deadly wish.  Jesse comforted his mother and sister as best he could, buried his father in a Harrisonburg cemetery.  He rode with his womenfolk to their home in Howard’s Lick Hollow and then rejoined his command at the South Fork camp. 

Latham’s report slowly wound its way up to General Kelley’s desk while the New Creek larder was filled with South Branch sheep.  The General was tired of the South Branch farmers who sheltered and supplied the vexing partisans.  He must also have been chagrined at the ineptitude of Latham’s Moorefield Raid.  Charged with the capture of the partisan command Latham contented himself with a short skirmish and cattle raid and then withdrew.  Kelley sent him explicit instructions for another foray to Moorefield.  Latham was to send one column down the west side of the South Branch from Burlington to Moorefield. A second column was to cross the river at Romney swing south down the Trough Road and enter Moorefield from the east, catching McNeill in a pincer.  At the same time the Swamp Dragoons, a company of the West Virginia Home Guards was to block the South Fork Road at Howard’s Lick Road cutting the Rangers line of retreat.  The expedition commander was to tell the people of Moorefield and the South Branch Valley that if they continued to supply McNeill the Valley would be laid waste as Sheridan had done to the Shenandoah. [2]   If it was executed properly the plan showed promise.

Lt. Col. Rufus E. Fleming had command of the expedition. He received his orders from Latham on the 24^th. Latham had sent word to the Swamp Dragoons to set their roadblock by daylight on the 28^th.  Fleming would lead a column of 120 cavalry and artillery down the main road to Moorefield.  Major Peter J. Potts of the 6^th West Virginia would lead the column of 155 swinging around to come in from the East.  They were all to be in position for the attack on the 28^th of November. Fleming was promised that additional forces would be sent to strengthen him.  The reinforcements never came. The Federal force spent the night of the 25^th at Burlington.  Potts had more ground to cover and set out on the 26^th.  Fleming gave him a day’s start and set off toward Moorefield on the 27^th. [3]

Curiously his orders mentioned neither McNeill nor Woodson.  The only mission specifically given him was to confiscate property.  “… General Crook desires that everything fit for army use be either brought off or destroyed while returning.  Take all the time needed to give a thorough raking to the entire country, and leave nothing but what is absolutely needed for family use.” [4]

Then on the 26^th Fleming’s orders were modified.  Civilians moved freely between the South Branch Valley and Union posts along the border.  Word of the order to “rake the entire country” leaked out.  South Branch Valley men at New Creek protested the order to lay waste to the country.  Latham sent to Fleming at Burlington, “The citizens here from the South Branch Valley propose to take measures to rid the country of McNeill’s men and to cooperate with us for that purpose.  This will be better than their destruction.  I inclose to you General Kelley’s telegram which will supersede your previous instructions with regard to the destruction of property.  You will, however, bring out the stock…” [5]

By the 26^th there was no legitimate expectation that the raid would surprise anyone.  If  citizens from the South Branch Valley knew of the expedition before Latham wrote on the 26^th then their friends in Moorefield knew it the next day.  Kelley’s plan for a coordinated attack to destroy the Rangers had become something else in the execution.  With the message of the 26^th the primary mission became just another cattle raid.

It went according to plan until Fleming’s scouts reported a strong picket at the ford three miles below the objective, the point at which Fleming planned to halt for the night awaiting the coordinated attack in the morning.  The scouts also brought in sketchy information that General Thomas L. Rosser with his division of Virginia Cavalry either in Moorefield or expected on the 28^th.  Fleming sent a skirmish line across the river at the ford.  It was a reconnaissance mission to find out whether Rosser was in fact in Moorefield and to make contact with Major Potts column.  It was also a trap.  A strong force of rebel cavalry, about 100 men, came out of the woods to engage the skirmishers.   They fell back across the river to Fleming’s lines. 

At the same time a second and equally strong rebel force moved up the road from Moorefield.  Fleming unlimbered his one gun and sent shells arching toward the advancing rebels.  Just then another force of about 100 rebels emerged from the woods along the river toward the Federal rear.  If they reached the gap ahead of the Federal column the encirclement would be complete.  The Union line was wavering and the Colonel ordered a retreat to avoid loss of his entire command.  It was a near thing.  The retreat became a general rout as each man recognized the danger of capture.  Hastily limbered the gun lost a wheel during the headlong flight and was abandoned.  Their one wagon and one ambulance were left behind.  As they reached the gap the fighting had become hand-to-hand.  The rebels left off the pursuit at the gap north of Moorefield.  Fleming lost about 20 men.  No one had made contact with Major Potts. [6]

Word of the rout reached Latham at New Creek at a little after 10 PM on the 27^th.  He immediately telegraphed the news on to General Kelley at Cumberland, Maryland.  Kelley asked for details and Latham replied that the enemy was not less than 800 mounted men of Rosser’s command. Kelley advised Latham that an attack on New Creek was probably in the offing and ordered him to put the post in “the best possible condition for defense”.  Col. Fleming reached New Creek shortly before midnight.  Latham wired Kelley, “I am prepared for them”. Nothing had been heard from Potts. [7]

Sound does strange things in the mountains and valleys.  Major Potts and his 150 men were just a few miles east of the action but no sound of battle reached them.  They had left Romney at 4 AM on the 27^th and moved south down the Grassy Lick Road to intercept the Northwestern Turnpike and followed that road to within a few miles of Moorefield where they made camp for the night.  At 4 the following morning Potts, not knowing that Fleming was no longer in the field, sent his men toward their objective reaching the town at dawn.

Potts troopers swept up a rebel picket and then charged the town.  As they entered town they met a strong cavalry force Rosser’s had left to occupy Moorefield and were quickly driven from town.  Potts quickly broke off the action and took to a mountain path to cross the river south of Moorefield then made for the Union lines. He still had no word of Fleming’s rout but he must have surmised that he had met a similar force. [8]

General Kelley had correctly guessed what the rebel commander was up to.  General Thomas L. Rosser and his division of cavalry augmented by Woodson’s Partisans and McNeill’s Rangers had been sent to attack and disrupt the railroad at New Creek.  After breaking off the engagement with Fleming he set the division on a night march to New Creek to be in position to attack by 10 the next morning. [9]  

The Fort Kelley garrison consisted of 700 cavalrymen and two batteries of artillery.  Fleming’s idea of putting the post in the best condition for defense was to post his pickets further out from the walls of Fort Kelley to provide an earlier warning of the Confederate approach. That done, he went to bed. The following morning he ordered a 20-man patrol on a scout to Burlington. [10]   Rosser dealt with the pickets by simply avoiding the roads where they were posted or capturing the posts with his overwhelming force.  The alarm never came on the morning of November 28^th.  Neither did word of Major Potts' 150 men come to Fort Kelley.

Rosser was in position having slipped between the pickets and the fort.  Latham’s patrol to Burlington was taking its time getting ready to depart on its mission.  All that stood between Rosser and the fort were a few men manning a picket line about 100 yards from the gates.  Most of the Federal force, both officers and men, were still in their quarters. [11]   About 11 AM on November 28, 1864 Rosser sent a company forward toward the last Union picket.  They were equipped with captured overcoats of Union Blue.  They were mistaken for Major Potts returning column.  Nobody challenged them as they came within pistol shot.  The surprise was complete.  The rebels drew their pistols and fired wounding 4 of the defenders. With the guards taken the advance rode into the fort and Rosser’s entire advance brigade followed.  Caught in their quarters most of the garrison never had the opportunity to resist.  Latham reported 443 captured.  The rest made it to the mountains surrounding New Creek. Latham was among the fugitives. [12]

Within a quarter of an hour the town of New Creek was completely in Rosser’s control.   The rebels set about the business of the raid, seizing and destroying Federal supplies and installations.  All of the public buildings and much of the railroad property at New Creek was devastated.  A detachment sent to Piedmont destroyed the machine shops that had been rebuilt after McNeill had burnt them two years before.  With his mission accomplished Rosser withdrew his force to Petersburg, WV.  There was no effective pursuit. [13]

Major Potts had made his way around Rosser coming out Elk Garden Road.  He had to abandon that route when he ran into one of Rosser’s detachments on the 28^th.  Again taking to mountain trails he crossed the mountain and camped the night of the 28^th on the B & O Railroad a few miles west of Bloomington.  Making his way along the B & O Potts came to devastated New Creek on the evening of the 29^th. [14]   His was   the only force equipped to follow the Confederates but they had been in the saddle under difficult circumstances since the 26^th.  Their horses were spent and they were tired.  Latham ordered Potts after the rebels. 

When Major Potts rode out of New Creek on the evening of November 30 he had only 90 of the 155 men he had led out of Burlington 4 days earlier.  Of those he had to send 10 back when their mounts could not go on.  He had just 80 left when he reached Greenland Gap.  Rosser had headed for Brocks Gap to return to the Valley leaving McNeill’s and Woodson’s partisan ranger commands behind to continue operating around Moorefield.  Potts found a detachment of 20 Rangers at Petersburg on December 1^st.  The partisans melted away toward Moorefield.  Learning that the Union Cavalry sent from the Valley to pursue Rosser had been at Moorefield on the 30^th and left that place in the direction of Brock’s Gap Potts concluded that his men and mounts simply could not follow Latham’s order to make contact with that body.  He turned back to Burlington.  As it was he had to leave three or four spent mounts on the road to Burlington.  He had pushed his shrinking column as far as they could go. [15]   Rosser’s plunder would feed and supply the Confederate army rather than the Union troops for whom it had been amassed.

Credit in the Army rolls up.  Disgrace rolls down.  Anticipating the censure that would come as the news reached his superiors and the War Department Kelley acted swiftly.  He made sure in his reports that the blame for the debacle rested solely on the shoulders of the post commander.  Kelley ordered Latham arrested and sent to Grafton for a formal Court Martial.  Latham was cashiered but as the war came to and end he was able to obtain reinstatement and an honorable discharge.  Within three months Kelley would suffer an embarrassment of his own when McNeill’s Rangers snatched him and his immediate superior, General George A. Crook from their beds and hustled them out of middle of the 8000-man garrison at Cumberland, Maryland and delivered them to General Jubal Early in Staunton.  Within six months Rosser’s Division was surrendered with the Army of Northern Virginia.